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ABSTRACT
The use of deception for the purposes of research is a widespread practice
within many areas of study. If we want to avoid either absolute acceptance
or absolute rejection of this practice then we require some method of
distinguishing between those uses of deception which are morally accept-
able and those which are not. In this article I discuss the concept of
counterfactual consent, and propose a related distinction between
counterfactual-defeating deception and counterfactual-compatible decep-
tion. The aim is to show that this proposed distinction will be useful in
furthering the debate regarding the use of deception for the purposes of
research.
INTRODUCTION
The use of deception for the purposes of research has
long been the subject of interest and concern from ethi-
cists and researchers alike. Many studies require that par-
ticipants be deceived about various factors, and this
raises interesting questions about the moral acceptability
of those studies. If we want to avoid either absolute rejec-
tion or absolute acceptance of this practice, then we face
the challenge of providing some method for distinguish-
ing between different cases. In response to this challenge,
some have argued that it is important to distinguish
between different types of deception, and that making
this distinction means that we can then judge the moral
acceptability of a given study depending on the type of
deception used. In this article I will highlight a distinction
between different forms of deception that appeals to the
notion of counterfactual consent. I aim to show how this
way of distinguishing between types of deception is supe-
rior to other suggestions in the recent literature, and to
demonstrate how it can shed light on the issue of when
the use of deception for the purposes of research ought to
be considered morally acceptable.
1. THE USE OF DECEPTION
IN RESEARCH
Deception can be said to have taken place whenever an
agent communicates in such a way as can be reasonably
expected to result in a false belief.
1 And the use of decep-
tion in various ﬁelds of research is fairly commonplace, as
has been noted throughout the literature on this topic.
2
For the purposes of this article, it will be useful to con-
sider particular examples and to highlight some of the
different ways in which deception can occur. Some exam-
ples of studies involving deception have recently been
provided by McCambridge et al.
3 In one of these studies,
1 D. Wendler & F.G. Miller. Deception in Clinical Research. In: E.J.
Emanuel et al., editors. The Oxford Textbook of Clinical Research
Ethics. New York, NY: Oxford University Press; 2008. p. 315–324, 316.
2 See, for example, J.H. Korn. 1997. Illusions of Reality: A History of
Deception in Social Psychology. Albany, NY: SUNY Press; and A.
Ortmann & R. Hertwig. Is Deception Acceptable? Am Psychol 1997; 52:
746–747.
3 J. McCambridge, K. Kypri, P. Bendtsen & J. Porter. The Use of
Deception in Public Health Behavioral Intervention Trials: A Case
Study of Three Online Alcohol Trials. AJOB 2013; 13: 39–47.
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original work is properly cited.participants believed themselves to be involved in a
review of general health and well-being when, in fact,
researchers were exclusively interested in their habits of
alcohol consumption.
4 That is, the subjects were deceived
about the true purpose of the research in which they were
participating, or why the experiment was being carried
out. A second example of the use of deception in research
can be taken from the work that has fuelled the recent
‘situationist’ movement in psychology and philosophy. In
many of these experiments, situations are manufactured
in order to observe how members of the public will react,
and to determine whether or not subtle differences in how
the situation is presented will alter those reactions.
5 In
one such experiment, a member of the research team gave
the impression of having accidently dropped some papers
in front of a stranger while walking through a shopping
centre. Researchers then noted how often members of the
public would stop to help collect the papers, and how the
frequency of helpful behaviour varied with seemingly
inconsequential features of the environment.
6 In this
example, then, steps were taken to mislead the subjects
about whether the research was even taking place, as well
as about certain other matters of fact, such as that the
papers had been dropped accidentally. For our ﬁnal
example we can use perhaps the most famous case of
deception in research – the Milgram experiments. In these
experiments, subjects were asked to administer electrical
shocks to another participant for the purposes of research
into the effects of punishment on learning behaviours.
7
However, the true purpose of the experiments was to
investigate obedience tendencies. The shocks were not
real and the other participant was in fact an accomplice
of the researchers. Therefore, in addition to being
deceived about why the experiment was taking place,
subjects were also deceived about certain other matters of
fact (such as whether or not the shocks were legitimate or
whether or not the victim was a fellow volunteer). These
examples highlight some of the ways in which deception
can be carried out – focusing on either the purpose of the
research, certain features of the research environment, or
even on whether or not an experiment is taking place. An
important question is how we ought to react to this wide-
spread practice – how does the use of deception impact on
the moral acceptability of a given study?
Moral absolutism regarding two separate questions
ought to be ruled out at this stage. The ﬁrst question
regards how we ought to view the impact of problematic
deception on the moral acceptability of a study. An
absolutist might think either that any study involving
problematic deception is automatically unjustiﬁable or
that any study lacking problematic deception is auto-
matically acceptable. Both of these positions should
probably be rejected, although the latter is more obvi-
ously wrong. There are many factors that can render a
study morally unacceptable, and the use of problematic
deception is only one of these. A given study may avoid
problematic deception and yet still be unjustiﬁable on
other grounds, such as the exposure of participants to
unacceptable risks, the violation of appropriate consent,
or perhaps even the pursuit of intrinsically immoral
research goals. The contrary absolutist response to this
question – that any use of problematic deception renders
a study unjustiﬁable – is more difﬁcult to dismiss. This is
partly because we do not yet have an understanding of
what is meant by ‘problematic’ deception. How this
phrase is to be interpreted will affect the acceptability of
this form of absolutism. However, it seems likely that,
on most interpretations, the absolutist line ought to be
avoided. It is at least theoretically possible that the ben-
eﬁts of a given study could be sufﬁciently high, and the
level of problematic deception sufﬁciently low, such that
the study would be justiﬁable overall. Perhaps any such
example would be unrealistic, but the possibility should
prompt us to be cautious about what we can expect from
the notion of ‘problematic’ deception. It is not necessar-
ily the case that all studies featuring problematic decep-
tion will be unjustiﬁable overall, or that all studies
lacking such deception will be acceptable overall. Con-
siderations stemming from deception alone will not
always be sufﬁcient to settle the matter, and to expect
this from a conception of problematic deception would
be to set the bar too high. We should instead expect a
useful conception of problematic deception to identify
those cases where the use of deception is prima facie
problematic. It ought to provide a method for identify-
ing those studies where there is a special burden of jus-
tiﬁcation (stemming from considerations of deception)
on those who want the study to be permitted. My pro-
posed distinction will aim to provide such a useful
conception.
The second question to which absolutism would be an
inappropriate response concerns which forms of decep-
tion ought to be considered problematic. The view that
all deception is problematic deception is not plausible.
For example, in certain placebo trials efforts will be taken
to make participants believe that they might be receiving
the actual drug, even after it has been determined that a
placebo will be administered. To that extent there is a
form of deception taking place, but this deception does
4 Ibid: 41–43.
5 See J. Doris. Lack of Character. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press; 2002; L. Ross & R. Nisbett. The Person and the Situation. Boston,
MA: McGraw Hill; 1991; D. Russell. Practical Intelligence and the
Virtues. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2009. Ch 9.
6 A.M. Isen & P.F. Levin. Effect of Feeling Good on Helping: Cookies
and Kindness. J Pers Soc Psychol. 1972; 21: 384–388. This case is
detailed in R. Adams. A Theory of Virtue. Oxford: Oxford University
Press; 2006. p. 117–118.
7 S. Milgram. Behavioral Study of Obedience. J Abnorm Soc Psychol
1963; 67: 371–378.
Alan T. Wilson 2
© 2014 The Authors. Bioethics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltdnot appear to be problematic.
8 We will consider later
exactly why cases of this sort seem unproblematic but,
whatever the explanation, the possibility of such cases
tells against the absolutist view that all deception be con-
sidered problematic. And we should also reject the con-
trary absolutist response to this question whereby
deception is never problematic. Imagine a study where
participants are informed that researchers will be observ-
ing their behaviour but are deceived into believing that
this process will end once they leave the laboratory. In
fact, the researchers follow the participants home and spy
on them through the window. This would appear to be a
morally problematic use of deception, and any researcher
wishing to carry out such an experiment might ﬁnd them-
selves hard-pressed to justify its use.
9 Providing real-life
cases of obviously problematic deception is more contro-
versial, although many have argued that the aforemen-
tioned Milgram experiments are of this sort.
10 Either way,
the very possibility of problematic deception is unlikely
to be questioned. Both absolutist responses to this ques-
tion ought, therefore, to be avoided. And if some forms of
deception are problematic while others are not, it will be
useful to have some method for working out how par-
ticular cases ought to be classiﬁed. I will now consider
some of the attempts in the recent literature to separate
those types of deception that are prima facie acceptable
from those that are prima facie unacceptable. I will argue
that these attempts are less helpful than might have been
hoped.
2. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN
DIFFERENT TYPES OF DECEPTION
One way of responding to this issue is by appeal to the
notion of autonomy. We can distinguish forms of decep-
tion depending on whether or not they undermine the
autonomy of the participants. Of course, as Nomy
Arpaly has highlighted, the term ‘autonomy’ has been
used in many different ways by many different theorists.
11
When assessing this approach it is important to be clear
about which understanding of autonomy we have in
mind. Rachel Zuraw appeals to a Kantian understanding
and then applies this to the problem at hand.
12 On the
Kantian understanding, respect for autonomy requires
that any rational agent ought always to be ‘treated as an
end in and of his or her self, and not merely as a means
towards fulﬁlling others’ goals.’
13 Zuraw aims to provide
a method of distinguishing types of deception that high-
lights the greater tendency of one form to infringe upon
an agent’s autonomy. The suggestion is that we distin-
guish between cases where the subject is deceived about
the goals of research and cases where the subject is
deceived about whether or not the study is even taking
place. As we saw above, the Milgram experiments and the
alcohol study described by McCambridge et al. would be
examples of the former. Cases from the situationist lit-
erature would provide examples of the latter. Zuraw
argues that deception about goals does not violate
autonomy but that deception about the existence of the
study does, and that this will be a useful distinction for
determining the acceptability of a study that uses decep-
tion. Zuraw states that:
Provided that the research participant has not been
misled about something that would actually cause
harm to her, a Kantian could argue that she had all of
the information necessary . . . Conversely, a person
who is studied without her knowledge has no opportu-
nity at all to consider whether her goals might be
served by participating in research, and is being used
merely as a tool for the researchers’ ends.
14
However, the distinction suggested by Zuraw will not
work. It is possible for subjects to be treated as mere
means even when the deception is (only) about the goals
of the research. Imagine a case where an agent would be
willing to participate in a study seeking to further the
understanding of certain cancer treatments, but would
not be willing to participate in a study focused on the
treatment of any other illness or disorder. With this infor-
mation in hand, it would be possible for researchers to
deceive the agent into believing that their study aims
to further the understanding of cancer treatments, and to
secure the agent’s participation as a result of this decep-
tion. In such a case, it is clear that the agent’s autonomy
is not being respected. It is also intuitively plausible that
this use of deception would be morally problematic.
Therefore, while some understanding of autonomy may
yet prove useful for our purposes, the distinction sug-
gested by Zuraw will not be sufﬁcient. The attempt to
uncover problematic uses of deception by distinguishing
8 The issue of whether deception is involved in placebo trials (and to
what extent) is covered in Wendler, Miller, op. cit. note 1, p. 316.
9 One (surprisingly) real example of research where subjects where
spied on without their knowledge is provided by Korn, op. cit. note 2, p.
3. In this case subjects were spied on while using a public urinal ‘by a
person using a periscope to peek under a toilet stall’.
10 See: D. Baumrind. Some Thoughts on Ethics of Research: After
Reading Milgram’s ‘Behavioral Study of Obedience’. Am Psychol 1964;
19: 421–423; H.C. Kelman. Deception in Social Research. Trans Action
1966; 3: 20–24; also the references in D. Mixon. Instead of Deception. J
Theory Soc Behav 1972; 2: 145–177. For a recent review of these experi-
ments and of their ethical status see G. Perry. Behind the Shock
Machine: The Untold Story of the Notorious Milgram Psychology
Experiments. New York: The New Press; 2013.
11 N. Arpaly. Unprincipled Virtue. Oxford: Oxford University Press;
2002. Ch. 4.
12 R. Zuraw. Consenting in the Dark: Choose Your Own Deception.
AJOB 2013; 13: 57–59.
13 Ibid: 58.
14 Ibid.
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and deception about whether research is taking place is
not as helpful as might have been hoped.
15
Another theorist who highlights the importance of
autonomy in this regard is C.D. Herrera.
16 In ‘Ethics,
Deception and “Those Milgram Experiments” ’, Herrera
argues that deception does not impact on an agent’s
autonomy, and is therefore less problematic, when the
agent has consented to being deceived in advance.
Herrera states that:
we can agree that when psychologists deceive subjects
with no advance warning they are using those subjects
as means to an end that the subjects cannot share . . . In
medical research, subjects in a clinical trial might par-
ticipate knowing that researchers are purposely with-
holding some information from them. In the same way,
psychologists could tell subjects in a psychology experi-
ment that they are deliberately withholding or even
misrepresenting details about the study. If a subject
understands that she is consenting on the basis of
incomplete information, her autonomy isn’t violated.
17
This suggestion – that prima facie unproblematic
deception will be deception with prior consent – has since
been repeated elsewhere.
18 And the suggestion brings with
it certain beneﬁts. First of all, it allows us to explain the
intuition that the deception used in certain placebo trials
(as mentioned above) is not problematic. Participants will
have been made aware of the possibility that they will
receive a placebo and that members of the research team
may perform actions designed to conceal from them the
truth of whether or not they are receiving the actual drug.
Given that the participant consents to this in advance,
any subsequent deception appears less problematic than
it otherwise would have. A further beneﬁt of Herrera’s
suggestion is that it leaves open the possibility that a
study where advanced consent for deception has been
received may nevertheless be morally unacceptable on
other grounds. It was suggested above that a realistic
conception of problematic deception would not entirely
answer the question of whether a given study is accept-
able or not. A study may yet be unacceptable on the
grounds that the levels of risk are too high or that the
consent offered was not sufﬁcient, and the suggestion
from Herrera is compatible with this fact. For these
reasons, the suggestion that we use the notion of
advanced consent to determine whether a participant’s
autonomy is violated and, therefore, whether the decep-
tion used is problematic, appears to be a step in the right
direction.
However, this way of responding to the issue cannot do
all of the work that is required. If we focus solely on
whether or not the participant has actually consented in
advance to being deceived then we will be left with certain
unanswered questions. This is because there will be some
studies where receiving advanced consent to be deceived
will be incompatible with the study itself. In some cases it
will not be possible to ask participants to consent in
advance to be deceived due to concerns that this will
render them suspicious and so less likely to behave natu-
rally during any experiment. In other cases it will not be
possible to ask participants to consent in advance at all,
such as in the situationist studies mentioned above where
members of the public are observed reacting to manufac-
tured scenarios. The current suggestion makes it the case
that it would be impossible to carry out any of these
studies without engaging in problematic deception, and
this result will be unintuitive to many. Furthermore, even
if we were inclined to accept this verdict, it would still be
useful if our method for distinguishing forms of decep-
tion would allow us to differentiate between examples of
this sort. Therefore, despite the beneﬁts of accepting
Herrera’s suggestion, we have reason to look for some
other distinction. A distinction appealing to a need for
actual consent will not be sufﬁcient for our purposes.
3. COUNTERFACTUAL CONSENT
An agent can be said to have given their counterfactually
robust consent, or counterfactual consent, when the fol-
lowing two conditions are satisﬁed: (1) they consent, and
(2) they are not ignorant of any fact that would have
caused them to withhold their consent if they were aware
of it. The notion of counterfactual consent can be made
clearer with an example. Suppose that a colleague asks
for permission to put a photograph of me ‘on the
website’. Assuming that they are referring to the depart-
mental website, and assuming that they are acting in a
professional capacity, I consent. However, unbeknownst
to me, they were actually referring to a website entirely
unrelated to our professional lives. In this case, the ﬁrst
condition for counterfactual consent has been met – I
offered my consent – but it is not yet clear whether the
second condition has been satisﬁed. This will depend
upon how awareness of the true nature of the website
would have impacted on my willingness to consent. If this
knowledge would have led me to refuse to consent then
15 A further worry with Zuraw’s suggestion is that it has nothing to say
regarding cases of deception which are about neither the goals of the
study nor the existence of the study. As we saw above, some studies
deceive participants about other matters of fact in order to observe their
reactions.
16 C.D. Herrera. Ethics, Deception, and ‘Those Milgram Experiments’.
J Appl Philos 2001; 18: 245–256, p. 250.
17 Ibid.
18 L. Bortolotti & M. Mameli. Deception in Psychology: Moral Costs
and Beneﬁts of Unsought Self-Knowledge. Account Res. 2006; 13: 259–
275, p. 266; D. Wendler & F.G. Miller. Deception in the Pursuit of
Science. Arch Intern Med 2004; 164: 597–600, p. 598; Wendler, Miller,
op. cit. note 1, p. 320–321.
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should say that my colleague did not have my
counterfactual consent. On the other hand, if I would
have been just as happy to consent upon uncovering the
true nature of the website then we can say that
counterfactual consent had in fact been secured. This
example therefore helps to explain the two necessary con-
ditions for counterfactual consent.
It is important to highlight the possible relationship
between counterfactual consent and the more widespread
notion of informed consent. It is not the aim of this article
to provide a set of necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for
informed consent, a notion that has been understood in
many different ways throughout the literature.
19
However, it is important to point out that some theorists
have included what I have listed as the second necessary
condition for counterfactual consent within their concep-
tions of informed consent. For example, Wendler and
Miller argue that an agent should not be considered to
have offered informed consent if they are unaware of ‘any
aspects of the study that would affect their willingness to
participate’.
20 It may be, therefore, that what I am calling
counterfactual consent is in fact one of the necessary
components of informed consent. However, it ought to
be acknowledged that counterfactual consent will be a
less demanding notion than informed consent, as is
shown by the example above. Regardless of how I would
have responded upon learning of the true nature of the
website, it is clear that, at the time of offering my consent,
I was not sufﬁciently informed. I was ignorant of an
important and relevant detail and so could not offer my
informed consent. However, we have seen that it was
possible for me to offer counterfactual consent, so long as
I would have consented upon becoming informed. There-
fore, the conditions for counterfactual consent are less
demanding than those for informed consent, and this
article aims to suggest that progress on the issue of using
deception in research can be made by appealing to the less
demanding notion. Similarly, Wendler and Miller include
the demand that ‘people are not deceived about aspects of
the study that would affect their willingness to partici-
pate, including risks and potential beneﬁts’ as just one
component in their list of restrictions on the use of decep-
tion.
21 Other necessary conditions in order for deception
to be acceptable include the requirement that participants
consent to the deception in advance (in a way similar to
Herrera’s suggestion) and that the full extent of the decep-
tion be revealed to participants following the study.
22
Again, the aim of this article is to suggest that appealing
to a less demanding set of restrictions will be sufﬁcient in
order to advance the debate regarding whether or not a
given instance of deception is itself problematic.
One further important aspect worth clarifying is that
counterfactual consent does require actual consent. The
ﬁrst necessary condition for counterfactual consent is
that the agent actually consents. This means that we
cannot correctly say that we have an agent’s
counterfactual consent if they have not actually con-
sented – regardless of whether they are fully informed or
whether they would have consented if asked. We saw
above that any appeal to actual consent will be insufﬁ-
cient for the purposes of identifying problematic forms of
deception. This is because it would automatically rule out
studies where securing actual consent is not possible –
such as in the situationist experiments – and would also
leave us with no resources with which to distinguish
between cases of this sort. Therefore, because
counterfactual consent is a form of actual consent, we
should not identify problematic deception as deception
lacking counterfactual consent. Instead, my proposal is
that a useful method for distinguishing forms of decep-
tion can be provided by focusing on just the second nec-
essary condition for counterfactual consent.
We can distinguish types of deception depending on
whether or not awareness of the information being con-
cealed would have caused the subject to refuse their
consent (regardless of whether or not that consent has
actually been received). If this is the case, then we can say
that we have an example of counterfactual-defeating
deception. On the other hand, if awareness of the con-
cealed information would not cause an agent to refuse
their consent, then we can say that we have an example
of counterfactual-compatible deception. In the example
above, imagine that my colleague purposely led me to
form my incorrect belief about the nature of the website
that would host my photograph. If awareness of the
facts would have led to my refusing to consent, then my
colleague is guilty of counterfactual-defeating deception.
If this is not the case then my colleague has carried
out counterfactual-compatible deception. And this fact
about the nature of the deception will be true regardless
of whether or not consent has actually been offered.
23
My suggestion is that the distinction between
19 E. Blacksher & J.D. Moreno. A History of Informed Consent in
Clinical Research. In: E.J. Emanuel et al., editors. The Oxford Textbook
of Clinical Research Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press; 2008.
p. 591–605.
20 Wendler, Miller, op. cit. note 1, p. 321. See also Wendler, Miller, op.
cit. note 18, p. 599. The importance of counterfactual robustness for
consent has also been highlighted recently in connection with a separate
issue within applied ethics (although not using this terminology). See T.
Dougherty. Sex, Lies, and Consent. Ethics 2013; 123: 717–744.
21 Wendler, Miller, op. cit. note 1, p. 323
22 Ibid.
23 The distinction here is different from that offered by Collin O’Neil
between ‘methodological manipulation’ and ‘inducement manipula-
tion’. The deﬁnition of those terms focuses on the intentions or ‘pur-
poses’ of the deceiver, whereas the proposal here makes no such
reference. The distinction proposed here would therefore generate dif-
ferent verdicts from O’Neil’s proposal. See C. O’Neil. Methodological
and Inducement Manipulation. AJOB 2013; 13: 55–57.
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deception can allow us to identify prima facie problematic
forms of deception. In order to show that this is the case,
we can now reconsider some of the examples set-out
above.
4. APPLYING THE PROPOSED
DISTINCTION
If we think that deception can sometimes be an accept-
able practice for the purposes of research then we have
good reason to consider whether or not the moral accept-
ability of a given study depends on the type of deception
that is carried out. I believe that the notion of
counterfactual consent leads us towards a useful way of
approaching this issue. Researchers (and ethicists evalu-
ating research methods) ought to distinguish between
counterfactual-defeating deception and counterfactual-
compatible deception. Cases of counterfactual-defeating
deception ought to be viewed with greater suspicion than
cases of counterfactual-compatible deception, and will
therefore generally require a higher level of justiﬁcation if
they are to be permitted. It will be useful to reconsider the
examples of deception that were set-out above in order to
show how this suggestion is in-line with intuitively
acceptable verdicts in speciﬁc cases.
In order to avoid controversy, I have provided two
ﬁctional examples in order to demonstrate some prima
facie unacceptable uses of deception in research. First,
there was the example where participants were deceived
regarding the length of time for which they would be
observed, with researchers then following them home and
spying on them through the window. This looks to be an
unacceptable use of deception, and the suggested method
agrees with that verdict. Awareness of the fact that they
will be followed home and spied on appears likely to
render a participant unwilling to give their consent. We
therefore have an example of counterfactual-defeating
deception and are rightly suspicious about the moral
acceptability of such a case. Secondly, in response to
Zuraw’s suggested distinction, I provided an example
where a participant was deceived about the purposes of a
study. Knowing that the agent would only consent to
participate in research with a particular focus, researchers
deceived the agent into believing that their study shared
that focus. This example seems particularly problematic,
and the proposed distinction can tell us why. We have
here a clear case of researchers (knowingly) engaging
in counterfactual-defeating deception. And we would
therefore be justiﬁed in asking serious questions about
the moral acceptability of their study. What these exam-
ples show is that the proposed distinction between
counterfactual-defeating and counterfactual-compatible
deception provides us with the intuitively correct
results in cases where the use of deception appears
unacceptable.
The proposed method also gets things right in the most
obvious cases of morally acceptable deception. Consider
again the placebo trials where participants know in
advance that they may be deceived into believing that
they are receiving the actual drug. We saw above that
Herrera’s appeal to advanced consent is one way of
explaining the acceptability of this example. Participants
consent in advance to the subsequent deception and this
explains why that deception is unproblematic. However,
the current proposal is also sufﬁcient for explaining this
fact. By actually consenting in advance to the possibility
that they will be participating in a study while receiving a
placebo, the participant provides strong evidence that
they would consent to participate were they to be aware of
the fact that they were receiving a placebo. We therefore
have good reason to believe not only that the deception
will be counterfactual-compatible, but that counter-
factual consent has actually been offered. Both of the
necessary requirements for counterfactual consent
appear to be satisﬁed. (Notice that this does not show
that informed consent has been offered, as there may yet
be some other relevant information of which the partici-
pant is not aware.) By consenting in advance to the sub-
sequent deception, the participant shows that the
deception will be counterfactual-compatible. The pro-
posed distinction is therefore able to accord with intui-
tions regarding cases of obviously morally permissible
deception, as well as cases of obviously morally problem-
atic deception. We should now consider cases where the
acceptability of deception is less obvious.
The three examples listed at the start of this paper are
all cases where the moral acceptability of a study is open
to question (for those who believe that deception is at
least sometimes permissible). I have already mentioned
that the use of deception in the Milgram experiments has
been criticized by some while defended by others. The
deception present in the experiments relied on by the
situationist movement would be rejected as impermissible
by Zuraw while accepted by others.
24 And McCambridge
et al. provide details of their study on alcohol consump-
tion with the express purpose of starting a debate on the
acceptability of the deception involved. We should not be
surprised by the level of uncertainty regarding these
studies, or by the level of disagreement that exists. The
proposed distinction allows us to diagnose the cause of
this uncertainty and disagreement. These are all cases
where it is difﬁcult to determine whether or not
the deception involved is counterfactual-defeating or
counterfactual-compatible. It is difﬁcult to predict
24 The original authors of the situationist example described above raise
no concerns about the ethical status of their study. See Isen, Levin, op.
cit. note 6.
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part in the Milgram experiments or in the study on
alcohol consumption had they been aware of the true
aims of those studies. And it is difﬁcult to predict whether
or not subjects would have consented to participate in the
situationist experiments had they been aware of what
was taking place. This difﬁculty speaks in favour of the
proposed distinction. Cases where there is uncertainty
about the level of acceptability are also cases where it is
difﬁcult to determine whether or not the deception
is counterfactual-compatible. This should give us
some conﬁdence that the counterfactual-defeating/
counterfactual-compatible distinction is tracking some
real and important feature of these cases. However, while
this match speaks in favour of the accuracy of the pro-
posed distinction, it is not good evidence of its practical
usefulness. Cases where we most require guidance regard-
ing the acceptability of a study are likely to be cases where
we will struggle to determine what kind of deception is
being carried out. How, then, can the proposed distinc-
tion actually further the debate on this issue?
The proposed distinction cannot provide a straightfor-
ward verdict in cases where we already struggle to deter-
mine the moral acceptability of a study. In contrast to
rival suggestions, we cannot settle the matter simply by
ﬁnding out whether the participants consented to the
deception in advance, whether the deception focused on
the aims or the existence of the study, or what the inten-
tions of the researchers were when carrying out the decep-
tion. However, it is not correct to say that the proposed
distinction is incapable of furthering the debate. This is
because the distinction allows us to identify the cause of
our uncertainty, and it suggests measures that can be
taken to resolve it. Uncertainty about the acceptability of
deception stems from uncertainty regarding whether the
deception will be counterfactual-defeating. To resolve
the uncertainty, therefore, we will require more
evidence about whether the deception actually will be
counterfactual-defeating. This evidence might be
obtained in any number of different ways. For example, it
may be possible to ask participants during debrieﬁng
whether or not they would have agreed to participate had
they known the relevant facts. Milgram appears to have
been sensitive to this way of defending the acceptability
of his experiments. In later papers he ﬁnds it important to
stress that ‘Of the subjects, 83.7 per cent indicated that
they were glad to have taken part in the study’.
25 Of
course, receiving this information at the end of the study
will not be ideal. The potentially problematic deception
will already have taken place, and we may also worry
about the judgement or candidness of those who
have been recently deceived.
26 However, studying the
feedback of those who have been subject to similar forms
of deception may prove useful when contemplating
future studies.
This will not be the only way of clearing up uncertainty
regarding whether some potential deception will be
counterfactual-defeating. For example, it would be pos-
sible for researchers to conduct a poll fully describing
their planned experiment and asking whether or not
people would be willing to take part. There is some evi-
dence that McCambridge et al. are in favour of such an
approach. In the process of justifying the deception
involved in their alcohol consumption study they point
out that ‘student participants generally suggest that they
do not mind taking part in deceptive studies.’
27 Again,
any such evidence will be defeasible, and we ought to be
cautious about this way of proceeding. Those surveyed
would need to be provided with full information about
the speciﬁc study, and we would need to be reasonably
certain that they were representative of the likely partici-
pants in the actual study. Even then, any evidence will be
less than deﬁnitive. It will always be possible that a given
individual will be subject to counterfactual-defeating
deception, even when all of the evidence suggests that the
same deception would be counterfactual-compatible for
most people. Perhaps the best that can be done is to
ensure that certain ameliorating procedures are in place
for whenever such a case is identiﬁed. One option would
be to ensure that the individual is given the opportunity
to withdraw their data from the study, and perhaps other
possible options ought to also be considered. Either way,
it is clear that procedures of this sort – asking for feed-
back from those who have participated in similar experi-
ments and questioning large numbers of people about
their willingness to take part in such a study – may allow
researchers to become more certain that the deception
involved in a given study will be counterfactual-
compatible. If a level of justiﬁed certainty is reached then
we ought to consider the deception used to be prima facie
morally acceptable.
Of course, such a process may place additional burdens
on researchers. For any study where the nature of decep-
tion is uncertain, researchers will be required to provide
evidence for the claim that the deception will be
counterfactual-compatible. This may require them to
conduct surveys detailing the precise nature of the experi-
ment and asking respondents whether or not they would
be willing to take part in such a process. If the response
indicates that consent would not be forthcoming then this
25 S. Milgram. Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to
Authority. Hum Relat 1965; 18: 57–76, p. 58. Further evidence of this
sort appears in S. Milgram. Issues in the Study of Obedience: A Reply
to Baumrind. Am Psychol 1964; 19: 848–852. Questions regarding
Milgram’s use of debrieﬁng are raised in Perry, op. cit. note 8, chapter 3.
26 See D. Baumrind. Research Using Intentional Deception: Ethical
Issues Revisited. Am Psychol 1985; 40: 165–174, p. 168–169.
27 McCambridge et al., op. cit. note 3, p. 44.
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deception) to disallow the study. It is important to
be clear once again that worries about problematic
deception are just one source of possible concern. Once
we have evidence regarding whether the deception will be
problematic, it is still possible that permission to proceed
ought to be granted or withheld on some other grounds,
such as levels of risk or lack of appropriate (actual)
consent. The measures suggested here will only address
the issue of whether considerations stemming from the
use of deception render the study problematic. Regard-
less of the increased costs to the researcher in carrying out
such measures, this process ought to be accepted as
clearly preferable to either a system of absolute rejection
of deceptive research (whereby many prima facie accept-
able studies would be disallowed) or a system of absolute
acceptance of deceptive research (whereby participants
may be subjected to problematic deception). In this way,
the distinction between counterfactual-defeating and
counterfactual-compatible deception suggests a way
forward in the current debate regarding the use of decep-
tion for the purposes of research.
CONCLUSION
I have attempted to show that the notion of coun-
terfactual consent points towards a useful way of identi-
fying problematic instances of deception. We ought to
distinguish between those forms of deception that are
counterfactual-defeating and those that are counter-
factual-compatible. With this distinction in mind, it may
be possible to advance the debate regarding the moral
acceptability of various forms of deception for the pur-
poses of research.
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